Dubious Practice? The Storm over Physician Self-Referrals by Pengidore, Carolyn M.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 31 Number 1 Article 8 
1992 
Dubious Practice? The Storm over Physician Self-Referrals 
Carolyn M. Pengidore 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carolyn M. Pengidore, Dubious Practice? The Storm over Physician Self-Referrals, 31 Duq. L. Rev. 167 
(1992). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol31/iss1/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Dubious Practice?
The Storm Over Physician Self-Referrals
I. INTRODUCTION
Put yourself, for a moment, in a rather grim situation: Your doc-
tor says you have cancer. As part of the treatment, he proposes
radiation therapy and refers you to an outpatient radiation center.
He owns stock in the company that owns the center.
Should he tell you?
If, for him, the investment is substantial, should he reveal that?
Indeed, if he stands to make more than 10 times his money in
two years, do you want to know?
Or, might you find the whole idea repugnant and feel that doc-
tors should be barred altogether from referring patients to facili-
ties in which they have a financial interest?
Such questions are not hypothetical. Businesses which provide
radiation treatment and other medical services to patients have
sprung up around the country. Many of these are financed by doc-
tor-stockholders who will profit by referring their patients to these
physician-owned facilities.' But federal and state regulators have
started clamping down on doctor-stockholders who become in-
volved in these business ventures.' What has developed is an in-
creasingly heated national debate over the propriety of self-refer-
ral.3 At issue is the basic question of whether doctors should make
1. A study by state regulators in Florida recently found that 40 percent of doctors
surveyed had invested in medical ventures to which they could recommend patients. State
of Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board, Joint Ventures Among Health Care Prov-
iders in Florida (1991). The American Medical Association says only about 10 percent of
American physicians are involved in such ventures, while other health care authorities have
placed the estimate at 25 percent. American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs, Conflicts of Interest: Physician Ownership of Medical Facilities, Journal of
the American Medical Association, 267, 2366 (May 6, 1992); Michael Waldholz and Walt
Bogdanich, Doctor-Owned Labs Earn Lavish Profits In A Captive Market, Wall Street
Journal, Al (March 1, 1989).
2. A spokeswoman for the Office of Inspector General noted that the Department of
Health and Human Services is currently investigating more than 200 cases around the coun-
try of alleged instances of physicians receiving kickbacks from facilities to which they refer
Medicare patients. Glenn Ruffenach, Medical Firms' Stocks Plunge on Probe News, Wall
Street Journal, B6 (June 26, 1992).
3. The term "self-referral" is used throughout this comment to mean referral by a
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money by steering patients to facilities in which they have a finan-
cial stake-whether it is for radiation therapy, diagnostic tests, lab
work, home infusion or rehabilitation.
The storm over physician self-referrals began brewing some
years ago when formal studies, such as the one done by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services' Inspector General's office
in May, 1989, discovered that, for example, patients of referring
doctors who invested in clinical labs received 45 percent more ser-
vices than Medicare patients in general.' This comment outlines
the growing federal and state legislation targeted at self-referral
practices, along with key cases which illustrate the latest judicial
views on interpreting the medicare fraud and abuse statute as ap-
plied to self-referral situations. Federal regulatory efforts by the
Office of the Inspector General and the Federal Trade Commission
to curb abuse by physician-investors are also highlighted, as well as
the conflict over the issue within the medical community. Set in
the background of increasing economic pressure from rising health
care costs, this article will provide the practitioner with a clear pic-
ture of how the legal risks are increasing for doctors who engage in
self-referral activity.
II. THE MEDICARE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
A. Medicare and Medicaid Reimbursement Programs
Medicare and other insurers reinforce the role of the physician
in procuring ancillary services by paying only for those determined
to be medically necessary and, as such, ordered by a physician.'
Medicare provides federal monies for medical services received by
eligible persons who are over age 65, disabled, or have end-stage
renal disease." The Medicare program is administered by the
Health Care Financing Administration of the Department of
Health and Human Services. Physicians receive payment for treat-
physician to a provider with whom the physician has a significant financial relationship.
4. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, Fi-
nancial Arrangements Between Physicians and Health Care Businesses, Report to Con-
gress (Doc. No. OAI-12-88-01410) (May 1989), ["OIG Report"].
5. 57 Fed Reg 8589 (1992).
6. 42 USCA §1395c (1991). Medicare Part A is the Hospital Insurance (HI) program
which provides reimbursement for services performed by hospitals and other institutional
providers. HI recipients must pay a set deductible and coinsurance amount to receive ser-
vices. Part B is the Supplementary Medical Insurance program which covers physicians'
services and related expenses. It is subject to an annual deductible and usually pays 80
percent of reasonable charges. Id at §1395j.
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ing Medicare beneficiaries by submitting an application for Medi-
care reimbursement to a federally-approved insurance carrier.
7
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides payments
for medical services received by the poor, the disabled, the elderly,
and other qualified recipients.8 Medicaid programs are adminis-
tered by state agencies, but are subject to federal regulatory guide-
lines." Physicians submit reimbursement applications for treating
Medicaid beneficiaries directly to the state agency.10 The federal
government contributes 50-80 percent of program costs (depending
on the per capita income of the state) and the state covers the
remaining costs."
Hospital reimbursement under Medicare is based upon a pro-
spective payment system (PPS).'2 Under PPS, reimbursements are
based on a fixed, predetermined sum for the treatment rendered.
This sum is determined by the "average cost of treating a patient
in a particular diagnostic-related group," regardless of the actual
cost of the treatment." Under this program, the provider loses
money if a Medicare patient's cost of care exceeds the prospective
payment.
Prior to 1992, Medicare and Medicaid programs reimbursed
physicians based on a retrospective system of payment. Reim-
bursement was based on the actual cost of delivering medical ser-
vices to patients. But in 1989, Congress mandated reform of Medi-
care physician payment practices in order to redistribute Medicare
money more fairly among physicians. 4 Resource-based relative
value scales (RBRVS) became effective January 1, 1992, with a
four year phase-in period.' 5 Under RBRVS, reimbursement is
based on the physician's work, practice expenses, and malpractice
7. 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 3350 (Aug 1989).
8. 42 USCA §1396 (1991). Because Medicaid is a welfare program, eligibility is gen-
erally related to economic need and every Medicaid applicant must show that his or her
income and resources fall below certain levels set by the states pursuant to federal guide-
lines. Medicaid represents a policy decision to provide welfare only to the deserving poor. 3
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 14,211 et seq (Mar 1992).
9. 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 14,010 (Jul 1989).
10. Id.
11. 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 14,905 (Dec 1990).
12. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub L No 98-21 § 60-107, 97 Stat 65, 149-
72 (1983). For an account of the Medicare system surrounding the change to and enactment
of PPS, see generally Hyman and Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives in
a "Competitive" Health Care Era, 19 Loy U Chi U 1133, 1136-43, 1166-69 (1988).
13. Id at 1138-1143.
14. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub L No 101-239, 6102, 103 Stat
2169 (1989).




As a result of these limitations on Medicare and Medicaid reim-
bursement, hospitals and doctors have embarked on a variety of
revenue-enhancing ventures.16 Concerned about the costs of exces-
sive utilization, Congress enacted Medicare and Medicaid fraud
and abuse laws in an attempt to police provider conduct to control
costs, protect quality, and encourage professional fidelity to pa-
tient interests.
B. Federal Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute
Section 1128B(b) of the Social Security Act provides criminal
penalties for individuals or entities that "knowingly and willfully
offer, pay, solicit or receive remuneration in order to induce busi-
ness reimbursed under the Medicare or state health care pro-
grams."17 The offense is classified as a felony, and is punishable by
fines of up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to five years.18
This provision is extremely broad. The types of remuneration
covered specifically include kickbacks, bribes, and rebates made di-
rectly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, or in cash or in kind." In
addition, prohibited conduct includes not only remuneration in-
tended to induce referrals of patients, but remuneration also in-
tended to induce the purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for
any good, facility, service or item paid for by Medicare or state
health care programs.20
16. For example, a review of the IRS Form 990 of one local hospital revealed a joint
venture between the hospital and staff physicians established to operate a cancer treatment
center. The hospital created a wholly-owned subsidiary which leased land from the hospital
and built the treatment facility. The subsidiary was the general partner in a limited part-
nership which subleased the facility from the subsidiary and operated the center. Staff phy-
sicians invested in the operation as limited partners and referred patients to the facility.
The hospital entered into a management contract with the partnership for management of
the facility, thus receiving tax-exempt income through its wholly-owned subsidiary's share
of partnership income, rental receipts, and its management fee. Allegheny General Hospital,
Form 990 (for fiscal year-ending June 30, 1990).
Nonprofit hospitals participating in hospital-physician joint ventures which engage in
self-referral activity may jeopardize their tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. The IRS has reversed its position on certain hospital-physician joint
ventures within the last year. Where a hospital forms a joint venture with members of its
medical staff, selling to the joint venture the gross or net revenue stream derived from the
operation of an existing hospital department or service, the transaction jeopardizes the hos-
pital's tax-exempt status. IRS General Counsel Memorandum 39862 (November 11, 1991).






The Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection
Act of 1987 added two new provisions addressing the anti-kickback
statute. Section 2 provided new authority to the Office of the In-
spector General ("OIG") to exclude an individual or entity from
participation in Medicare and state health care programs if it is
determined that the party has engaged in a prohibited remunera-
tion scheme."' These civil sanction provisions were intended to
provide a remedy, short of criminal prosecution, for regulating
abusive business practices.2 The OIG has aggressively pursued en-
forcement of these provisions which allow civil penalties and exclu-
sion of providers from the Medicare program. 2 The civil sanction
proceedings are administrative in nature, criminal intent need not
be shown, and the standard of proof is preponderance of the evi-
dence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.24
On their face, these provisions seem to proscribe a wide variety
of transactions generally common in the economy, and arguably of
value in the health care arena. Practices that may encourage com-
petition or efficient production of health care might, under a literal
reading of the fraud and abuse statute, be felonies under the fed-
eral law. Considerable effort, therefore, has been made by the judi-
ciary to identify approaches that interpret the statute in order to
separate beneficial and detrimental conduct.
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Provision
In United States v. Greber,s5 the court held that if payments
were made to a physician to induce future referrals, even if the
payments were compensation for actual services rendered by the
physician, the Medicare anti-kickback provision had been vio-
lated.2' Greber involved a diagnostic services company (Cardio-
Med, Inc.) which provided physicians with a Holter-Monitor2 7 Af-
ter Cardio-Med had analyzed the data received from the moni-
21. 42 USCA §1320a-7(b)(7) (1991).
22. 56 Fed Reg 35952 (1991).
23. Civil penalties of up to $2,000 per violation may be imposed on physicians who
file false or fraudulent Medicare or Medicaid claims. 42 USCA §1395a-7a(a) (1991). Upon
conviction of fraudulent behavior by a state or federal agency, convicted physicians may be
excluded or suspended from the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Id at §1320a-7.
24. 55 Fed Reg 12205, 12209 (1990).
25. 760 F2d 68 (3rd Cir 1985), cert denied, 447 US 988 (1985).
26. Greber, 760 F2d at 71.
27. Id at 70. This device was worn for 24 hours by the patient and would record
cardiac activity. A technician scanned the tape and recorded the data in a diary. Id.
1992
Duquesne Law Review
tored patient, it would bill Medicare for this service.2 8 The data
was then returned to the physician along with a portion of the
Medicare payment that supposedly covered interpretation fees for
services the physician would perform after receiving the data."
These interpretation fees were provided to physicians even though
Cardio-Med already had interpreted and evaluated the data.30 Be-
cause the physician would receive a benefit from the arrangement,
there was an incentive for the physician to retain an ongoing rela-
tionship with Cardio-Med for their services. Although the defense
argued that the funds were for professional services rendered, the
court concluded that where an intent to receive future referrals ex-
ists, the statute has been violated.3' Greber thus demonstrates that
the proper inquiry in analyzing economic arrangements involving
physician referrals is not whether there is some legitimate purpose
or explanation for a payment, but whether one purpose of the pay-
ment is to induce future referrals.
Two other circuits have lent further support to a broad reading
of the statute. In United States v. Kats,2 the partial owner of a
medical clinic was convicted for conspiracy to commit Medicare
fraud and for receipt of kickbacks in exchange for referral of Medi-
care payments. Kats concerned an arrangement between physician
offices or clinics, a phlebotomy service ("THC"), and a clinical di-
agnostic laboratory ("Tech-Lab").3 3 Under the arrangement, THC
collected blood and urine samples from physician offices and medi-
cal clinics, and forwarded these laboratory specimens to Tech-
Lab.3 ' Tech-Lab performed the laboratory tests and billed the re-
spective insurance programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. 5
Tech-Lab kicked back 50 percent of its proceeds to THC, which in
turn paid out part of its proceeds to various physicians' offices and
clinics, including a clinic owned by Yan Kats.3 6 Kats and others
were prosecuted and convicted under the statute. In upholding
Kat's conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth




31. Id at 71.
32. 871 F2d 105 (9th Cir 1989).
33. Id at 106.






Greber that "if one purpose of the payment is to induce future
referrals, the Medicare statute has been violated." 8 The Kats
court held that the statute is violated unless the payments are
"wholly and not incidentally attributable to the delivery of goods
or services. '' 9
United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hospital Rental
Service Inc.,'0 involved a municipal employee who received pay-
ments as a consultant to an ambulance company and who played a
role in the awarding of the city's contract for ambulance service to
that company. The court rejected the defendant's contentions that
no showing had been made that (1) the employee received any
more than his consultant services were worth,' 1 (2) the consulting
contract with the ambulance company was entered into with spe-
cific intent that the employee would influence the bid process (the
employee received payments before the bid process began), and (3)
the payments to the employee were conditioned upon his affecting
the city contract." The court emphasized that the gravamen of a
violation of the statute is "inducement" and not necessarily the
structure of the arrangement. 3 The court said it was irrelevant
that the payments might reflect the value of the employee's ser-
vices because "giving a person an opportunity to earn money may
well be an inducement to that person to channel potential Medi-
care payments toward a particular recipient."" The court also re-
jected the contention that a violation requires proof that "the
payee actually performed the improper acts for which he was
paid."' 5 The decision rendered in Bay State thus stands for the
proposition that a payment intended to induce a referral (or in
that case a recommendation to purchase) is illegal, even if it is not
conditioned on or does not result in a referral. The inducement is
illegal even if it is only one of several purposes of payment, so long
as it is not merely incidental. "6
Limited partnerships, believed to be excluded from the scope of
the anti-kickback and fraud provisions when properly structured, 7
38. Greber, 760 F2d at 69.
39. Kats, 871 F2d at 108, n1.
40. 874 F2d 20 (1st Cir 1989)
41. Id at 29.
42. Id at 36.
43. Id at 29.
44. Id.
45. Id at 34.
46. Id at 30.
47. Hamilton and Page, Fraud and Abuse, The Treatment of Limited Partnerships
1992
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have recently come under increased judicial scrutiny. The Inspec-
tor General v. Hanlester Network48 involved the appeal of a ruling
made by an Administrative Law judge in favor of the defendants
in this first case to propose exclusion from participation in Medi-
care and Medicaid programs for acts proscribed under the anti-
kickback statute.49 Hanlester Network had issued private place-
ment memoranda offering limited partnership shares in three
clinical laboratories.5 0 The number of investors in each partnership
was limited to 35 individuals or entities, with offerings limited to
licensed physicians actively practicing in the laboratory's geo-
graphical area and to others whose ownership of shares would (in
the promoter's judgment) benefit the laboratory."' Business was
solicited from both partner and non-partner physicians, but the
limited partners were targeted as the primary source of partner-
ship business.52 The private placement memoranda indicated that
a partner's return on investment would be based on partnership
profits, not the number of referrals s.5  The prospective partners
were told they could expect an annual profit of greater than 50
percent of their investment.
5 4
The Inspector General alleged that distributions offered or paid
by limited partnership laboratories to physician investors in a posi-
tion to refer Medicare and Medicaid patients for tests were know-
ingly and willfully offered or paid as "remuneration. . . to induce"
and Physician Recruitment and Incentive Plans Under Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and
Abuse Statutes, (Pennsylvania Bar Institute on Health Care Reimbursement, 1990). This
article provides guidelines on what to avoid when structuring limited partnerships based on
the then proposed safe harbor regulations (see note 70 and accompanying text), the OIG
Report, the April 1989 OIG Fraud Alert on Joint Venture Arrangements, and the final ver-
sion of the Stark amendment which added Section 1877, "Limitations on Certain Physician
Referrals" to the Social Security Act. For example, the amount of the return should not be
related to the referral volume; equal investment opportunities should be given to referring
and non-referring investors; investing physician referrals should not be monitored by the
entity; the rate of return should not be disproportionately large in relation to the invest-
ment, and financial disclosure should be made to the referred patient. The authors' posi-
tions are that despite the broad scope of the fraud and abuse statute, any per se prohibition
against patient referrals by physician-investors is limited to those health care services or
facilities which have a documented propensity for abuse.
48. CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide, New Developments, 139,566, 27,739 (HHS
Appeals Board, App Div, 1991).
49. Id at 27,740.
50. Id at 27,741.






referrals.5 The key issue on appeal was whether the Inspector
General had to prove that the offer or payment was conditioned
upon the physicians agreeing to-refer Medicare and Medicaid busi-
ness to the laboratory, so that the physicians' choice of laboratories
was precluded. 56
Ruling in favor of the Inspector General, the Appeals Board held
that a violation of the anti-kickback statute occurs whenever an
individual or entity knowingly and willfully offers or pays anything
of value, in any manner or form, with the intent of exercising influ-
ence over a physician's reason or judgment in an effort to cause the
referral of Medicare-related business. 7 The lack of an agreement
requiring referrals, and the lack of proportionality between refer-
rals by and returns to referring partners was not determinative."
The Appeals Board reasoned that because: (1) every referral made
by a limited partner would cause incremental increases of his pay-
ment, (2) most of the referrals and the resulting revenue came
from limited partners, and (3) partners were told that their refer-
rals were essential to the venture's success, it could be inferred
that the limited partners were aware of the potential impact of
their referral decisions on their future income.59 Addressing the
fact that not all limited partners had made referrals, the Appeals
Board ruled this did not prove a violation did not occur, and fur-
ther stated that it wasn't necessary for the OIG to show that a
payment actually succeeded in inducing a referral for it to have
been intended to serve as an inducement.6 0 The Appeals Board
said that inferences regarding intent may be drawn from the struc:
ture of the venture: whether the offering is limited to potential re-
ferral sources; whether the investments were sought for capital
needs of the venture; whether the venture met a need for services
in the community; and whether the structure was designed to per-
mit physicians to evade restrictions on their profiting from tests
they order by taking advantage of the reference laboratory excep-
tion.61 Inferences regarding intent may also be drawn from the de-
gree of nexus between the remuneration and the referrals.2 Even
55. Id at 27,740.
56. Id.
57. Id at 27,739.
58. Id at 27,741.
59. Id at 27,755.
60. Id.




where payments are not made in proportion to actual referrals, the
smaller the number of partners, the greater the impact each physi-
cian's referrals will have on his return and the greater his incentive
to refer." In reviewing evidence of an intent to induce referrals,
the Appeals Board stated it will consider whether the value offered
was sufficient to interfere with the physician's judgment based on
legitimate considerations, such as cost, quality, and necessity of
service." The Appeals Board did not believe a finding of actual
harm to the Medicare program was necessary to show a basis for
exclusion, but viewed evidence which does show overutilization or
reduced quality of services as relevant to determine whether the
incentive offered was sufficient to induce referrals.6 5 The Appeals
Board remanded the case back to the Administrative Law judge to
amend his findings in light of their broader interpretation of the
anti-kickback statute.66
On remand, HHS Administrative Law Judge Steven Kessel
found cause to exclude the Hanlester network from Medicare and
Medicaid business for two years, and to permanently exclude the
three individual labs. 7 The doctor-investors were not named in the
Inspector General's action.68
D. Safe Harbor Provisions
Subsection D of the Medicare Patient and Provider Protection
Act of 1987 authorized the Secretary of HHS to promulgate regula-
tions specifying those business and payment practices, or "safe
harbors," that are not subject to criminal prosecution under 1128B
of the Act and that will not provide a basis for exclusion from the
Medicare program or from state health care programs under sec-
tion 1128(b)(7) of the Act.6 9 The proposed safe harbor regulations
were issued by the OIG on January 23, 1989.0 After a period for
public comment, the final regulations were issued on July 29,
63. Id.
64. De minimis or very remote forms of renumeration, such as drug samples or re-
cruitment lunches, may not be subject to prosecution. If the remuneration offered is un-
likely to affect physician referral decisions, it is probably not intended to induce referrals,
absent clear evidence to the contrary. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id at 27,762.
67. Brian McCormick, HHS Ruling Keeps the Heat on Physician Self-Referral,
American Medical News, 35, 5 (March 23, 1992).
68. Id.
69. 42 USCA §1320a-7b (1987).




The following payment practices are safe harbors which, al-
though potentially capable of inducing referrals of business under
Medicare or a state health care program, will be protected from
criminal prosecution or civil sanctions under the anti-kickback
provisions of the statute.
Congress did not intend to bar all investments by physicians in
health care entities to which they refer patients where the invest-
ment interest was in a large public corporation and such invest-
ments are available to the general public.7 2 In order to qualify for
the safe harbor for investment interests, the investor must meet
the applicable standards within one of two classes of entities. In
setting standards, the OIG differentiated between investments in
large, publicly traded and small, privately held enterprises.
If the entity has more than $50 million in tangible net assets, the
following five standards apply:
* First, if the investment is an equity security, it must be regis-
tered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.73
* Second, the investment by the referring physician must be ob-
tained on terms equally available to the general public trading on a
registered securities exchange.74 Public trading assures that the en-
tity does not obtain capital by self-selecting investors based on
their status as sources of referrals. 75 Any investment interest ob-
tained before the entity becomes publicly traded or obtained by
physicians before the general public has an opportunity to invest is
not protected.
76
* Third, the entity must not market or furnish the entity's items
or services to passive investors differently than to non-investors or
participate in cross-referral arrangements.
77
* Fourth, the entity must not loan funds to or guarantee a loan
for an investor who is in a position to make or influence referrals
to, furnish items or services to, or otherwise generate business for
the entity if the investor uses any part of such loan to obtain the
71. 56 Fed Reg at 35952 (cited in note 22).
72. Id at 35953 (cited in note 22).
73. 42 CFR § 1001.952 (1991).
74. Id.
75. 56 Fed Reg at 35965 (cited in note 22).
76. Id.
77. 42 CFR § 1001.952 (cited in note 72). A "cross-referral" arrangement exists when
investors in entity "A" are explicitly or implicitly encouraged to refer to entity "B" in re-
turn for entity "A" receiving referrals from investors in entity "B". 56 Fed Reg at 35969




* Finally, the amount of payment to an investor in return for the
investment interest must be directly proportional to the amount of
the capital investment of that investor. 9
All five standards must be met to the extent they apply to the
investment in question. The intent behind protecting investors in
large publicly traded stocks is that the remuneration received by
these investors is so tangentially related to their referrals that the
potential for abuse is minimal.8 0
The OIG realized that a large number of newly formed entities
are designed to have physicians as investors specifically to induce
them to use the entity in which they have invested.81 Thus, the
OIG attempted to include safeguards to minimize any corrupting
influence the investment interest may have on the physician-inves-
tor's decision where to refer a patient.82 The provisions for invest-
ments in small entities were specifically written to cover limited
and general partnership interests.8 s
The first standard which must be met to achieve safe harbor
protection for payments to investors in the entity is that investors
who make referrals or furnish items or services cannot own more
than 40 percent of the entity.84 At least 60 percent of the entity
must be held by investors who will neither make referrals nor en-
gage in business with the entity. 5
The second standard focuses on the status of the investor and
bars safe harbor protection where the terms of the investment op-
portunities depend on whether the "passive" investor (i.e. limited
partner) is in a position to influence referrals or otherwise generate
business for the entity." Investments can be offered to such inves-
tors only on the same terms as to other passive investors who are
not in a position to influence the flow of business to the entity.81
The third standard requires that the terms on which the invest-
78. 42 CFR § 1001.952 (cited in note 73).
79. Id.
80. 56 Fed Reg at 35964 (cited in note 22). Investment in most publicly traded drug
companies, for example, would fall under this exception. Thus, a physician can prescribe a
drug manufactured by a publicly traded company in which the physician owns stock with-
out risking criminal sanction. 54 Fed Reg 3094 (1989).
81. 56 Fed Reg at 35966 (cited in note 22).
82. Id.
83. 56 Fed Reg at 35967 (cited in note 22).
84. 42 CFR § 1001.952 (cited in note 73).
85. 56 Fed Reg at 35968 (cited in note 22).
86. Id.
87. 42 CFR § 1001.952 (cited in note 73).
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ment is offered cannot be based on past or expected referrals or
business generated for the entity.88
The fourth standard bars the entity from requiring passive in-
vestors to make referrals or remain in a position to make referrals
as a condition for retaining their investment. 9
The fifth standard parallels that for publicly traded entities and
requires the entity and investors not to market or furnish items or
services to passive investors in any manner differently than to non-
investors.90 An entity or investor may not promote the services of
other entities as part of a cross-referral arrangement.9 1
The sixth standard requires that no more than 40 percent of an
entity's gross revenue come from referrals, or items or services fur-
nished by investors.92 Coupled with the first standard which re-
quires 60 percent outside ownership, these two standards assure
that the entity is not dependent on the capital and referrals of
physician-investors.93 The purpose behind these two requirements
is to force these entities to compete for outside business.94
The last two standards focus on financing and profit distribu-
tions. A condition of safe harbor protection is to assure that invest-
ments by referring physicians are bona fide, i.e., that investors'
funds are genuinely at risk." The seventh standard parallels that
for investments in large publicly traded entities. These entities
cannot lend or guarantee loans used to make the investment.
9 6
Where an investor makes an investment with money loaned to him
from the entity, he adds no real capital to it. This standard was
meant to assure the investors provide needed new capital and the
joint venture is not a sham to facilitate the distribution of pay-
ments for referrals. 7
Finally, the eighth standard requires the amount of payment to
each investor be directly proportional to capital investment.9 8 In
other words, to receive protection, dividend payments can only be
tied to the number of shares owned by an investor, and not to
88. Id.






95. Id at 35970 (cited in note 22).
96. Id.
97. Id.




Safe harbor protection was also extended to space and equip-
ment rentals where there is a written lease for a minimum term of
one year and the rental charges are set forth in advance and reflect
fair market value in an arms-length transaction without regard to
volume of referrals or business generated between the parties. 10
For example, hospitals that give rent concessions to staff physi-
cians leasing private office space or equipment would not fall
within the safe harbor. 01 "Per use" or "per procedure" leases or
contracts with referring physicians in which the compensation var-
ies with actual use of premises or equipment are highly suspect
under the fraud and abuse statute. 02
Personal service and management contracts will receive safe har-
bor protection provided they meet standards similar to those for
space and equipment rentals.' 0 Finally, safe harbor protection was
extended to payments made for the sale of a practice; payments
made to referral services that are related to the cost of operating
such service and not based on volume of referrals; manufacturer or
supplier warranty payments; certain buyer discounts; payments to
employees or by vendors to a group purchasing organization; and
waivers of beneficiary coinsurance and deductible amounts. 04
III. THE ETHICS IN PATIENT REFERRALS ACT
A. Section 1877, "Limitations on Certain Physician Referrals"'0 6
Introduced in the House of Representatives as the Ethics in Pa-
tient Referrals Act,"0 6 section 1877 of the Social Security Act pro-
hibits physicians from making referrals for Medicare-financed ser-
vices to clinical laboratories in which the physician (or an
immediate family member) has a financial interest.10 7 It is also ille-
99. 56 Fed Reg at 35970 (cited in note 22).
100. 42 CFR § 1001.952 (cited in note 73).
101. 56 Fed Reg at 35972 (cited in note 22).
102. Id at 35973 (cited in note 22).
103. 42 CFR § 1001.952 (cited in note 73).
104. Id.
105. Section 6204 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (Pub L 101-239,
enacted on December 19, 1989) added section 1877, "Limitations on Certain Physician Re-
ferrals," to the Social Security Act. In addition, section 4207(e) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Pub L 101-508, enacted on November 5, 1990) amended certain
provisions of section 1877 of the Act.
106. This Act is often referred to as the "Stark Amendment," named after Rep. Fort-
ney (Pete) Stark of California who introduced the bill in the House of Representatives.
107. 42 USCA §1395nn.
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gal for a clinical laboratory to bill for services provided subject to
such illegal referrals. 0 8 The Act became effective for referrals
made on or after January 1, 1992.109
The Act is subject to a number of exceptions. First, physicians
may refer to laboratories supervised by other members of a group
practice or HMO of which they are a part."10 Second, physicians
may refer to laboratories in which they own publicly traded stock
if the assets of the corporation exceed $100 million."' Third, rural
clinical laboratories are exempt." 2 Finally, physicians may refer to
the laboratories of hospitals in which they have an ownership in-
terest, by which they are employed, or from which they rent office
space or have received physician recruitment incentives, if specific
statutory requirements are met to assure that arrangements are in
good faith and at arms-length." 3
Sanctions for violations of the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act
include denial of payment by Medicare; refunds to the Medicare
beneficiary if any payment was received for a service provided pur-
suant to a prohibited referral; civil penalties of up to $15,000 for
each item or service provided pursuant to a prohibited referral; ex-
clusion from the Medicare program for both the physician and the
provider; and civil penalties of up to $100,000, along with exclusion
from the Medicare program if the referral is made in connection
with a circumvention scheme such as a cross-referral
arrangement.'"
The Act was passed to close a loophole in the Medicare anti-
kickback statute which allowed promoters to disguise referral
schemes as legitimate business arrangements. Such arrangements
typically involved partnerships with referring physicians, consult-
ing arrangements, and franchise corporations wholly-owned by
physician investors with the service provider as manager.
While the legislative history to the Act cites numerous examples
of fraud and abuse in the areas of radiation therapy, physical ther-
apy, and diagnostic testing facilities, the final version of the Act
was reduced from a general prohibition against self-referrals by










care or Medicaid patients to clinical laboratories. " 5
B. Proposed Rulings to Implement Federal Ban on Self-
Referrals of Medicare Patients to Clinical Laboratories
On March 11, 1992, the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) published its proposed rulings to incorporate section 1877
of the Social Security Act into its regulations. " 6 The newly re-
leased regulations were published after Medicare carriers surveyed
entities that had billed them for lab services within the past year,
asking for detailed ownership information. " 7
The proposed rulings use terms similar to those used within the
OIG's anti-kickback safe harbor provisions, but emphasize that the
two sets of rules are independent of each other." 8 The HCFA
noted that referrals for clinical laboratory services to be furnished
for a physician's non-Medicare patients are not affected by the
proposed rule." 9 The HCFA also stated that a physician who has
no financial relationship with a clinical laboratory outside his own
office would not be affected by the proposed rule unless ordering
clinical laboratory services under a consultation request from an-
other physician who does have a financial relationship with. the
laboratory, or who is participating in a "contravention scheme."' 20
Financial relationships entered into in order to comply with the
new provisions of the Act are not exempt if they do not qualify
under one of the statutory exceptions.' For example, if a group of
physicians attempted to sell a laboratory by January 1, 1992, in
order to comply with the referral prohibition, but sold it for a fixed
price with installment payments that extend beyond the January
1, 1992, effective date, the physicians would still be precluded from
making referrals to the laboratory. 2 This is because physicians
115. The OIG Report revealed that at least 25 percent of the nearly 4500 independent
clinical laboratories surveyed were owned in whole or in part by referring physicians, and
provided overwhelming evidence of abuse in the utilization of physician-owned clinical labo-
ratories. 57 Fed Reg at 8589 (cited in note 5)
116. 57 Fed Reg at 8588 (cited in note 5) (to be codified at 42 CFR § 411j).
117. Diane M. Gianelli, Clamping Down on Self-Referrals, American Medical News,
35, 1 (April 6, 1992).
118. 57 Fed Reg at 8595 (cited in note 5).
119. Id.
120. Id. The HCFA recommends that attending physicians provide the consulting






who receive installment payments from the sale of their laboratory
have an incentive to refer business to the laboratory to maintain
its financial viability until all payments are received.
12 3
The proposed rulings also extend the prohibition to situations
where Medicare benefits are secondary to benefits paid by third
party payers, such as employer group health plans. 2 " Entities
which furnish clinical laboratory services under prohibited refer-
rals may not bill the employer group health plan for their
services.'25
The proposed rulings outline exceptions which apply to specific
services including: physicians' services in a group practice, in-office
ancillary services, and services furnished to prepaid health plan en-
rollees. 26 For example, the prohibition does not apply in the case
of physicians's services provided personally by another physician
in the same group practice as the referring physician, but the pro-
posed rulings strictly define "group practice" in such a way as to
outlaw many shared lab arrangements.
27
An exception is also made for investments in publicly traded se-
curities where the corporation has total assets which exceed $100
million. 2 8 Like the anti-kickback safe harbor provisions, the pro-
posed regulations require that the stocks be purchased on terms
generally available to the general public. The $100 million in assets
requirement applies only to the corporate entity which furnishes
the clinical laboratory services, and assets of a related corporation
(for example a parent, subsidiary, or sister corporation) may not be
considered in qualifying the laboratory under the $100 million as-
set test.12 9 The HCFA also proposed that the assets must be ob-
tained within the normal course of business, any assets obtained
primarily for the purpose of meeting the $100 million requirement
would be excluded from consideration.
3
Specific providers are also excluded from the prohibition on re-




127. A "group practice" is defined as a group of two or more doctors legally organized
as a partnership, professional corporation, foundation, non-profit corporation, faculty prac-
tice plan or similar legal entity. But several independent practitioners who enter into a part-
nership to provide lab services for their individual practices will not qualify for the exemp-
tion. Id.





ferrals, including laboratories located in rural areas. In order to
prevent this rural laboratory exception from being abused, the
HCFA proposed to add a requirement that at least 51 percent of
tests referred to the rural laboratory must be referred by physi-
cians who have offices in the rural area. 31 This requirement is
meant to assure that the laboratory is in fact serving rural benefi-
ciaries, and is not simply located in the rural area for the purpose
of furnishing services referred by urban owners for their urban pa-
tients.132 The rural laboratory is also required to operate as a full-
service laboratory and cannot be a "shell" lab with a rural ad-
dress. 3 When physician-investors refer to a rural lab, the tests
must be performed on the lab's premises.13 If a referral to another
lab is necessary, tests must be billed by the lab that performs
them.
135
The proposed regulations also specify exceptions for hospitals in
Puerto Rico, ownership in hospital laboratories, and certain other
compensation arrangements.
3 6
IV. PHYSICIAN SELF-REFERRAL AMENDMENTS OF 1992
On July 1, 1992, the House Ways and Means Health Subcom-
mittee passed H.R. 5142, the Physician Self-Referral Amendments
of 1992.17 Cosponsored by Rep. Kasich (Ohio) and Rep. Santorum
(Pa.), the bill would amend section 1877 of the Social Security Act
to extend the ban on physician self-referrals to all payers and to
radiology and diagnostic imaging services, radiation therapy ser-
vices, physical therapy services, and durable medical equipment.'38
The Act also adds exceptions for managed care facilities and
health maintenance organizations, as well as a waiver for valuable
community service when approved by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services."3 9 The Act proposes a divestment period of two
years for physicians with an investment in an affected facility, and
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is otherwise effective six months after enactment. 4"
The bill will now move to the full committee where it is expected
to face stiff opposition, even though the Bush administration has
come out in favor of outlawing physician self-referrals.'
V. ANTITRUST CONCERNS
For physicians who thought the only legal risk they ran by in-
vesting in medical joint ventures was drifting outside Medicare's
safe harbor provisions, they need to think again. In a speech to the
National Health Lawyers Association, FTC Competition Director
Kevin Arquit warned that doctors who refer patients to firms in
which the doctor has a financial interest are being closely ex-
amined by the Federal Trade Commission.142 The aim is to stop
anti-competitive behavior by physicians as part of the FTC's effort
to use antitrust laws to help control rising health care costs.
Arquit stated that the FTC is "aggressively pursuing several in-
vestigations" of self-referrals which could result in prosecution and
government-ordered breakups of physician joint ventures."14 The
focus of these investigations are physician joint ventures formed to
provide services or goods in a market outside of, but functionally
related to, the participating physicians' professional practice."4
The typical joint venture involves a group of physicians forming a
partnership to set up a clinical laboratory, a physical therapy
center, or a diagnostic imaging facility. Arquit pointed out that the
same physician-owner incentives for self-referral that lie at the
heart of the conflict-of-interest issue also give rise to antitrust con-
cerns: the potential for creating or enhancing market power in
markets for ancillary goods or services, which result in higher
prices and lower quality health care to consumers and monopoly
profits to some health care suppliers.'"
The principal antitrust concern with physician joint ventures is
the creation or enhancement of market power in the market for the
particular ancillary goods or services offered by the joint venture.
140. Id.
141. Sharon McIlrath, Dr. Sullivan Hit Hard Backing Bush Reform Plan, American
Medical News, 35, 1 (March 9, 1992).
142. Kevin Arquit, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, A
New Concern in Health Care Antitrust Enforcement: Acquisition and Exercise of Market
Power by Physician Ancillary Joint Ventures, speech before the National Health Lawyers






If such market power has been attained, the antitrust laws may
have been violated because the entity was created by the aggrega-
tion of competitors into a single dominant venture or by other ex-
clusionary conduct. In describing physician-owned joint ventures
which give rise to antitrust concerns, Arquit expanded on the con-
cept of achieving market share by controlling access-what he
called "channeling" patients-through the ability to make refer-
rals. He stated that the antitrust significance of physician channel-
ing to doctor-owned facilities turns on the efficacy of such channel-
ing, and not on the particular mechanism by .which it is carried
out. 146
Arquit outlined several antitrust legal theories which could be
used to challenge physician-owned ventures. Proceeding on a Sher-
man Act section 2 monopolization theory,147 the agency could
charge doctors with forming an illegal monopoly.
The FTC could also use section 7 of the Clayton Act to attack
joint ventures which could "substantially lessen competition."'148 A
third approach looks to section 1 of the Sherman Act 49 and fo-
cuses on proving an agreement among the joint venturers to refer
all patients to the venture to the exclusion of competitors. Explicit
proof of the agreement would not be necessary in such a case, but
may be found implicit in the process by which the venture was
formed.
Recent court of appeals decisions' 0 also could be used to prose-
cute hospitals for attempted monopolization under section 2 of the
Sherman Act when the hospital steers discharged patients to a par-
ticular supplier in which the hospital has a financial interest.
Finally, pricing policies used by physician joint ventures may
arouse antitrust concerns. Where the only integration among phy-
sicians is in ownership of equipment, and the physician-owners'
medical practices remain separate, an agreement among them on
the price they will charge for their independent delivery of medical
services, can under certain circumstances, be viewed as per se un-
lawful horizontal price fixing. And, physicians who condition the
provision of medical treatment on the purchase of ancillary ser-
146. Id.
147. 15 USC §2 (1975).
148. 15 USC §18 (1975).
149. 15 USC §1 (1975).
150. Key Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v Venice Hospital, 919 F2d 1550 (11th Cir




vices -from their joint venture may be subject to a tying violation.
VI. STATE LEGISLATION
Despite the broad federal provisions, state legislators have taken
up the cause against self-referral as well. Two dozen bills are cur-
rently pending in various state legislatures to curb self-referrals. 151
The scope of state legislation currently on the books varies from
disclosure requirements152 to outright bans on the practice.'53
In April, 1992, Florida legislators approved a strict measure that
both capped fees and prohibited self-referral to various facilities.
Considered landmark legislation on the issue of self-referral, the
Florida bill, with a few exceptions similar to those found in the
federal safe harbor provisions, bans all doctor self-referrals for
clinical lab tests, diagnostic imaging, rehabilitation and radiation
therapy effective July, 1992.11' The legislature also capped all fees
at 115 percent of the Medicare rate - -regardless of who picks up
the tab.'55
The impetus behind the Florida legislation was a three-volume
report by the Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board re-
leased last fall which uncovered abusive self-referral practices in
doctor-owned labs, diagnostic imaging, and rehabilitation cen-
ters. 156 The Florida study disclosed that two out of every five doc-
tors in the state had an interest in a venture to which they could
151. Thomas M. Burton, Physicians Who Own Labs May Refer Patients to Them for
Tests, AMA Says, Wall Street Journal, B6 (June 24, 1992).
152. Pennsylvania, for example, requires that prior to referral, a health care provider
must disclose to the patient any financial interest or ownership in the facility and advise the
patient of his freedom to choose in selection of a facility. 35 Pa Cons Stat Ann §449.22
(Purdon 1991). Arizona, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, Virginia, Washing-
ton, and West Virginia also have disclosure requirements. Teri Randall, Good Intentions Do
Pave Road to Save Harbors, But Taking Contravention Avenues Remains Risky, Journal of
the American Medical Association, 266, 2330 (November 6, 1991).
153. Michigan enacted one of the nation's toughest laws governing physician's con-
flicts of interest after a 1983 study by Michigan Blue Cross and Blue Shield comparing price
and usage of 20 doctor-owned labs versus 20 independent labs revealed that doctors refer-
ring to facilities in which they had an ownership interest ordered on average almost twice as
many tests as doctors referring to the independent labs, at 175 percent the per test cost of
the independent labs. The Michigan law bars physicians from referring patients to medical
facilities in which they have a financial interest. Waldholz and Bogdanich, Wall Street Jour-
nal at Al (cited in note 1); Mich Stat Ann §14.15(16221) (Callaghan 1988 and Supp 1992).
154. Patient Self-Referral Act of 1992, Fla Stat §178 (1992).
155. Id.
156. State of Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board, Joint Ventures Among
Health Care Providers in Florida (1991).
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refer patients. 1 7 It further revealed that Florida doctors owned 93
percent of all diagnostic imaging centers in the state.158 Doctors
who engaged in self-referral were shown to order twice as many
tests at an estimated cost to the state of $500 million a year in
unnecessary tests.159 Moreover, the study concluded that physi-
cian-owned facilities provided limited access to services for rural or
underserved indigent patients.1 60
Other states are considering similar action. Both houses of the
Tennessee legislature passed self-referral bills in the last legislative
session at the, end of April but postponed final deliberations until
next year. 161 The Tennessee Medical Association supports the less
stringent Senate bill, which would ban referrals to off-site centers
where physicians would not perform the service.
16 2
In Rhode Island, legislators are considering two bills that would
curb physician self-referral. One is a comprehensive self-referral
prohibition that would subject physicians to a 30-day loss of their
medical license for initial violations, and the other is intended to
regulate physician investment in pharmacies.' The latter legisla-
tion, which was approved in late April, does not ban physician re-
ferrals to pharmacies they own, but says that investment in phar-
macies can constitute a reason for the state Pharmacy Board to
deny or revoke a license of a drug-prescribing healthcare
provider. 164
New York's Governor Cuomo has suggested a blanket ban on
physician-investor referrals, while the neighboring state of New
Jersey will allow referrals to physician-owned facilities in effect as
of July 31, 1991, so long as disclosure is made, but has banned
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Burton, Wall Street Journal at B6 (cited in note 151).
160. Testifying before the House Ways and Means Health Subcommittee at a hearing
on physician ownership and referral arrangements, economist Jean Mitchell, an associate
professor at Florida State University who conducted the Florida study, stated that many of
the [physician-owned] joint ventures refuse Medicaid patients, and "none are located in
medically underserved areas." This situation contradicts the contention that joint ventures
improve geographic access to services. Fran Pollner, Self-Referral Ban Wagon Rolls On:
Rep. Stark Showcases More Negative Findings On Physician Ownership Of Ancillary Fa-
cilities In A Crusade That May Yet Encompass More Than Clinical Lab Owners, Medical
World News, 32, 15 (Nov 1991).







referrals to arrangements formed after that date.1 65 In Missouri, a
bill which bans physicians from referring patients to physician-
owned physical therapy centers has passed the Missouri House and
is now before the state legislature. 66
The California House also passed a bill banning self-referrals
1 67
after a study conducted by the New York-based firm of William
M. Mercer and funded by Industrial Indemnity of San Francisco,
revealed that physician self-referrals for workers' compensation
costs may be costing California employers more than $350 million
in workers' compensation costs annually.168 The study entitled
"The Frequency of Provider Ownership and Investment on Refer-
ral Patterns in California Workers' Compensation and the Eco-
nomic Impact of such Phenomena" also concluded that twice as
many patients are referred for physical therapy when a physician
who initially treats the patient has an ownership in the physical
therapy services, and that claims with a referral-for-profit relation-
ship were 28 percent more expensive than those from independent
ownership cases. 69
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States probably has the highest quality and most
innovative health care system in the world, but can barely afford
the system in place today or the cost burdens that threaten it over
the next 40 years. The issue of health care cost and availability has
been placed on the forefront of the American political agenda for a
variety of reasons.
In 1991, health care expense was about 14 percent of gross do-
mestic product (GDP), up from only 5 percent in 1960.170 Absent
reform, the aging population and a higher rate of inflation in
health care services imply a 25 percent share of GDP by the year
2030.171 Health care costs totaled $585.3 billion in 1990, and in the
face of multi-billion dollar budget deficits, represented 13.3 per-
165. Terese Hudson, States Extend Message of Stark Referral Bill, Hospitals, 66, 62
(May 20, 1992).
166. Brian McCormick, Physical Therapists Push Self-Referral Ban in Missouri,
American Medical News, 35, 6 (March 2, 1992).
167. Hudson, Hospitals, 62 (May 20 1992).
168. Angela K. Calise, Study Scrutinizes Use of Physician Self-Referrals, National
Underwriter Property & Casualty-Risk & Benefits Management, C4 (March 2, 1992).
169. Id.
170. William Dudley, The U.S. Health Care Conundrum, Goldman Sachs Economic




cent of total federal government expenditures in 1991.172 The situ-
ation at the state government level is similar. Total Medicaid
spending climbed at a 11.3 percent annual rate between 1980 and
1990.171 In 1991, Medicaid spending by the states averaged about
14 percent of total expenditures, up from about 9 percent in
1980.74
About 35 million people in the United States do not have health
insurance coverage 175 and businesses have scaled back employer-
paid private insurance coverage in an attempt to cope with rising
costs. Business health care spending as a share of total compensa-
tion has climbed significantly in recent years, to 7.1 percent of to-
tal compensation in 1990 from just 4.9 percent 10 years earlier.
176
Corporate health care costs amounted to a whopping 46 percent of
profits in 1991, after increasing 12 percent from 1990.177 Moreover,
these costs do not come close to representing businesses' true
liabilities.
The investment community has recently been stunned by the
size of estimated costs to provide health care to retirees of U.S.
corporations. Disclosure required by FAS 106 beginning in 1993
will force companies to show on their balance sheets the huge un-
funded future liabilities for retiree health care benefits. 178 Esti-
mates of the current national liability range from less than $300
billion to $2 trillion. 179 A new awareness of cost has enlightened
the average worker as well, as employers have begun to shift the
health care cost burden onto their employees. Health care has been
a major issue in 75 percent of the labor strikes over the past 2 to 3
years.
In the face of these staggering statistics, the average doctor's in-
come rose to $132,300 in 1987, up from $113,192 in 1970, outstrip-
ping the average gain in workers' incomes.' Average real weekly
earnings for workers actually declined over the same period.'
172. Id at 5.
173. Id at 6.
174. Id.
175. Id at 1.
176. Id at 5.
177. Ron Winslow, Firms Restrain Rate of Growth Of Health Costs, Wall Street Jour-
nal, B1 (February 4, 1992).
178. Financial Accounting Statement No. 106, Employers' Accounting for Postretire-
ment Benefits Other Than Pensions, Financial Accounting Standards Board (1990).
179. Sharon Kahn, Companies Face Up to FAS 106, Global Finance, 64 (December
1991).




There is little evidence that this increase occurred because doctors
were previously underpaid. Doctors in the United States are paid
far more than in other countries, both absolutely and relative to
the average worker's income. According to a recent study by the
Congressional Budget Office, in 1986 the ratio of physician's earn-
ings to the average worker's earnings was 5.1 in the United States,
compared with 4.3 for the former West Germany, 3.7 for Canada,
2.5 for Japan, and 2.4 for the United Kingdom." 2
The general public is likely to have little sympathy for wealthy
doctors whose business practices skirt the grey areas of self-referral
laws. Meanwhile, physician payment reform is likely to increase
the potential for abuse as physicians seek income from joint ven-
ture facilities to supplement declining practice revenues.'
The health care community itself is split over the issue of self-
referral. At a recent meeting in Chicago, the governing body of the
American Medical Association (AMA) sent shockwaves through
the medical community when it reversed itself and endorsed the
practice of self-referral.'8 ' The move by the AMA's House of Dele-
gates runs counter to AMA ethical guidelines which currently con-
demn the practice.' The American College of Radiology, with its
182. Id at 10 (citing Rising Health Care Costs: Causes, Implications, and Strategies,
Congressional Budget Office, April 1991).
183. The Future of Healthcare: Physician and Hospital Relationships, Arthur Ander-
son and American College of Healthcare Executives (1991).
184. Ruffenach, Wall Street Journal at B4 (cited in note 2). Resolution 5, introduced
by the New Jersey Delegation at the June, 1992, meeting of the AMA's House of Delegates
provides that "medically necessary referrals by a physician to an off-site facility in which
he/she has a financial interest is ethical if the patient is fully informed of the ownership
interest and the existence of any available alternate facilities." American Medical Associa-
tion House of Delegates. ,The vote to endorse the practice of self-referral comes just six
months after a unanimous vote by the House of Delegates to approve the AMA Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affair's position against self-referral.
185. Burton, Wall Street Journal at B6 (cited in note 151). The AMA Council on Ethi-
cal and Judicial Affairs has taken the position that, in general, physicians should not refer
patients to a health care facility outside their office practice at which they do not directly
provide care or services when they have an investment interest in the facility. Physicians
may invest in and refer to an outside facility if there is a demonstrated need in the commu-
nity for the facility and alternative financing is not available. Current Opinions of the
Council On Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics (1992).
Indeed, the Council recently strengthened its position and called for aggressive enforce-
ment by state and county medical societies of the Council's existing guidelines on conflicts
of interest. The Council published its latest report after having the AMA's Center for
Health Policy Research review empirical evidence of overutilization and abuse in physician-
owned facilities. The review validated the results of the OIG Report, the study issued by the
Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board, and a third study entitled "Frequency and
Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in Office Practice - A Comparison of Self-Referring and Ra-
diologist-Referring Physicians," by Bruce Hillman which appeared in the New England
Duquesne Law Review
27,000 members, including both radiation oncologists and diagnos-
tic radiologists, has come out strongly opposed to self-referral.'
The group has gone so far as to testify before Congress in support
of "legislative efforts prohibiting reimbursement for therapeutic
procedures carried out in a facility in which the referring physician
has a direct or indirect financial interest. 1 87 Lee F. Rogers, the
Radiology College chairman, wrote in a personal letter to the edi-
tor of the New England Journal of Medicine: "We have found the
potential and actual abuse and exploitation of patients by unethi-
cal practices, and the flagrant disregard of physician's responsibili-
ties to the patient so great and so pervasive that these arrange-
ments must be disallowed."' 8
It's no surprise that many within the medical profession are
against the practice. At risk is the doctor's reputation, as the gen-
eral public may perceive the physician as just another entrepre-
neur who leaves no stone unturned in his efforts to make a buck.
Dr. Arnold Relman, former editor-in-chief of the New England
Journal of Medicine, argues that doctors profiting from self-refer-
rals are involved in blatant conflicts of interest which would not be
tolerated in the business world.' He points out that a purchasing
manager at a major corporation who confides to his boss that he
placed business with a supplier in which he had a vested interest
would be summarily fired.' e0 Or a judge who decides a case be-
tween two companies while holding stock in one of them, would be
violating every canon of judicial behavior.' 9 ' Referring doctors
serve as both concerned purchasing manager and impartial judge
for their patients, and yet incredibly, try to argue that having an
economic interest in the facilities to which they are sending their
Journal of Medicine (December 6, 1990). The Hillman study concluded that physicians with
a financial interest in diagnostic imaging facilities referred patients at a rate of 4 to 4.5
times that of noninvesting physicians. Council Report, Conflicts of Interest: Physician Own-
ership of Medical Facilities, Journal of the American Medical Association, 267, 2366 (May
6, 1992).
A spokeswoman for the AMA said that this unusual conflict between the AMA House of
Delegates and its Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs is unlikely to be resolved until the
December, 1992, meeting of the House of Delegates. Telephone interview with AMA's Pub-
lic Information Office (July 7, 1992).
186. Rhonda Brammer, Radiation Care is at the Center of the Storm Over Self-Refer-
rals, Barron's, 10 (March 30, 1992).
187. Id.
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patients won't influence their judgment.
Rampant entrepreneurship among physicians is a malady that
requires strong medicine. It is an axiom of health care that pa-
tients trust their doctors to refer them to the best, most economi-
cal and most convenient clinic available. Disclosure requirements
imposed by many states do not go far enough and are often ig-
nored. With cutthroat competition for patients, doctors who con-
trol patient referrals can lock up the market and drive indepen-
dent providers out of business. One home care service
administrator from Montgomery, Alabama expressed this concern
in a letter to Rep. Stark. She wrote,
Physician owned services in our area severely limit our ability to compete.
Often patients are not given an opportunity to choose a home care service.
Physicians refer their patients directly to their own company and the pa-
tient accepts that referral never knowing that another service is available.
Realistically, even if physicians follow the AMA guidelines and inform pa-
tients about their financial involvement in a medical service to which they
refer, the disclosure has little meaning. Human nature dictates that we must
trust our doctor. After all, if we are willing to trust a doctor with our life, we
have to believe that everything that doctor does for us is necessary and of
the highest quality available. People may ask their doctors questions, but
they seldom question their doctors." '
The practice of self-referral raises three major policy concerns.
First is the risk that physician-investors may not refer patients to
the facility that provides the best care. Second, patients may be
referred for costly services which are unnecessary. Finally, compe-
tition on price and quality of service is undermined. The Physician
Self-Referral Amendments of 1992 proposed by Representatives
Kasich and Santorum effectively address these policy concerns.
This legislation should be endorsed by all who are opposed to abu-
sive self-referral practices.
The storm over self-referrals is unlikely to blow over. The literal
language of the federal anti-kickback statute provides room for
broad judicial interpretation to prohibit self-referral practices. The
trend toward increasing the scope of business practices which fall
within the federal prohibitions is likely to continue as evidenced by
the holdings in Greber, Kats, Bay State, and Hanlester. Since the
safe harbor provisions were published in July, 1991, most individu-
als in the physician community have been trying to comply. Those
who do not are at greater risk because it will become increasingly




more difficult to claim in court that the law is unclear. Federal reg-
ulators have vowed to be aggressive in pursuing doctors who vio-
late the statute. 193 Finally, as studies such as that done in Florida
reveal widespread abuse of self-referral practices, economic pres-
sure brought on by skyrocketing health care costs will influence
public sentiment and cause the judiciary, legislators, and regula-
tors to act to further curb self-referral activity.
Carolyn M. Pengidore
193. Since October, 1987, the OIG has opened 838 cases of alleged kickback violations
in the health care area. Physicians were involved in 460 of those. Nearly 600 have ended in
settlements, exclusions, or penalties, including 83 criminal violations. Randall, Journal of
the American Medical Association, 266, 2330 (November 6, 1991).
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